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NARRATIVE SEMANTICS AND MOTIF THEORY 
Lubomir Dolezel, 
University of Toronto, Canada 
From the Russian poetics of the 1920's, we have inherited 
two different approaches to the study of narrative, semantics: 
a/ the Tomashevski approach /Tomashevski 1928/ which is 
the first version of a theory of the minimal semantic units 
of narrative, called motifs; 
b/ Propp's approach /Propp 1928/ which is an attempt to 
formulate macrostructural interpretations of stories in 
terms of functions. In the Russian poetics, the relationship 
between the two approaches was never spelled out. After the 
war, the development of the two approaches was rather 
lopsided: Proppian semantics became very popular /esp. during 
the 1960's/ in the form of a generalized Propp model, of Lévi-
Strauss' s mythological model and of various psychoanalytic 
models; in contrast, Tomashevski's contribution to narrative 
semantics has not been widely recognized, although some of 
the important contributions of the French Structuralists are 
to be properly placed within the framework of Tomashevski's 
approach /see esp. Barthes 1966, Bremond 1966, Todorov 1969/. 
The reason for the independent development of the two 
forms of narrative semantics lies obviously in the fact that 
the relationship between Tomashevski's motif and Propp's 
function is rather difficult to describe explicitly. It is 
clear that in order to arrive from the motif level to the 
function level, some kind of interpretive transformations 
are necessary; however, the exact form of these transformations 
is unclear. Already Propp pointed out that the interpretative 
transformations are context-dependent, i. e. a motif /or a 
motif sequence/ is interpreted as a certain function according 
to its role in the overall story structure; thus, for-, example 
in Propp's model of the Russian fairy-tale, the motif of 
"abduction" is interpreted as the function of "Villainy", 
or, in other words, it appears as one of the manifestations 
.of "Villainy". However, not every "abduction" is "Villainy"; 
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if, for example, the hero abducts his beloved from 
inimical parents, no "Villainy" in Propp's sense is committed. 
This example shows that the relationship between motifs 
and functions cannot be described by simple generalizations. 
Propp's function is not a class of semantically homogeneous 
motifs; rather, semantically non-homogeneous motifs can become 
manifestations of one and the same function. This situation 
has led some representatives of Proppian semantics to deny 
any regular and systemic relationship between the "surface" 
meaning of a narrative text /expressed in motifs/ and its 
"deep" macrostructural interpretation /expressed in functions 
or similar concepts/; macrostructural meaning cannot be 
derived /by some systematic procedures/ from the "surface" 
meaning. ^ Under this assumption, Proppian semantics becomes 
a subjective, purely intuitive guessing game. 
Challenging this assumption does not mean eliminating 
the possibility of assigning various macrostructures to 
one and the same narrative text. Clearly, macrostructural 
interpretations are to a high degree dependent on cultural 
ideological, historical and even psychological factors. In 
narrative theory, however, we have to postulate the necessity 
of formulating - in each case - the interpretive trans-
formations as explicitly and systematically as possible. 
Only if this postulate is satisfied, macrostructural 
interpretations are defensible /can be falsified/ and a 
distinction between interpretations and misinterpretations 
can be made. 
This paper will not be devoted to the problem of interpretive 
2 
transformations; " rather, I would like to bring out the point 
that the application of interpretive transformations is 
impossible if the "surface" meaning of narrative texts has 
not been analyzed. In other words', a theory of the "surface" 
meaning is a necessary precondition for macrostructural 
interpretations. This assumption leads us back to Tomashe vski' s 
programme and, in fact, justifies the integration of this 
\ 
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programme into narrative semantics. Tomashevski's semantics 
and Propp's semantics appear as complementary parts of an 
integrated semantic theory of narrative texts. 
Tomashevski's semantics - i. e. theory of narrative 
motifs - will answer certain questions which are of fundamental 
importance, in particular: a/ What is the set of possible 
states and events that enter into the formation of stories? 
b/ What is the set of narrative individuals and in what kind of 
"roles" they participate in the narrated states and events? 
Obviously, such "classical" categories of narrative as 
"description", "narration", "character" etc. should be explained 
in the framework of the motif theory. By specifying the 
necessary elementary categories of stories, motif theory will 
not only pave the way for the macrostructural interpretations, 
but also offer its own interesting insights into story 
structuring. 
In accordance with Tomashevski's concept, motif can be 
defined as semantic representation of the "nucleus" of 
narrative sentence. Each simple and complete narrative sentence 3 
manifests a motif. Assuming that the semantic representation 
of a sentence nucleus is to be based on its logical form 
/Harman 1972:25/, we shall represent motif as a predicate 
accompanied by one or more arguments: Pred. /Arg. j-,...Arg<n/. 
Semcintic interpretations of this logical form will yield a 
system of motifs which should correspond to our pre-theoretical 
categories /"descriptive motifs", "action motifs", etc./. 
One way of interpreting semantically the logical form of 
sentences was offered by the linguistic theory of "case 
4 -grammar". In its original form /Tesniere 1959, Fillmore 1966/, 
"case grammar" specified the arguments of the logical form in 
terms of a universal class of "deep cases" /Agentive, Instru-
mental, Dativ-, etc./, while the Prad. expression remained 
uninterpreted. In subsequent developments /see, esp. Chafe 
1970, Halliday 1970/, the Pred. expression was interpreted 
and different "case frames" were assigned to different semantic 
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categories of the predicate. Thus Chafe distinguished /as 
his basic categories/ predicates of state, process and 
action, while Halliday those of action, mental process 
and relation. 
While offering a set of interesting semantic categories, 
"case grammar" is, in principle, unsatisfactory as a basis 
of motif theory /cf, van Dijk 1973:164f./. "Case grammar" 
has been a semantics of isolated sentences, while motif 
theory is to be a text-type semantics. This postulate 
becomes obvious, if we consider some simple examples. In 
isolation, a sentence like John died is ambiguous, since 
it can describe a set of fundamentally different events: 
"John died of natural causes", "John died in an accident", 
"John was killed by somebody", "John committed suicide". 
Since it is precisely the specific character of John's 
death which is of narrative significance ^ a motif theory 
must be capable of distinguishing the various events which 
are described by the ambiguous sentence. A similar example 
has been already discussed by Davidson /see Davidson 1971:6/. 
The sentence John spilled the tea can be interpreted in 
three ways: as an intentional action of John , as an unintended 
accident and as a consequence of somebody else's action. No 
semantics of isolated sentences can disambiguate these and 
similar event descriptions and assign different semantic 
representations to the different possible "readings". 
And the other hand, such problems have been extensively 
discussed in contemporary theory • /logic, philosophy/ of action. 
Consequently, it has been claimed /van Dijk 1974/75, Dolezel 
1976/, theory of action is of major significance for narrative 
semantics. Narrative semantics cannot make a substantial 
progress, unless the problems and the results of the theory 
of action are fully absorbed. On the other hand, we can 
expect that a developed semantics of narrative motifs will 
throw some light on the complicated problems of the general 
theory of action. 
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In the classical form - which, in-my opinion, still 
retains its essential validity - theory of action was 
formulated by Georg H. von Wright /see esp. von Wright 
1963, 196fl/. The essence of von Wright's approach consists 
in his logical analysis of the concept of event. Event is 
defined as change of ar initial state into an end-state. 
Action is then a specific category of event. 
Thus, in von Wright's theory, the concepts of state, event 
and action represent the fundamental categories; our claim 
is that these are also the fundamental categories of motif 
theory. The categories can be introduced in the following 
way: 
1. Let us consider world U^ whose individuals - called 
Objects - have no ability to change and no ability to bring 
about change. In this world, the Pred. expression of the 
motif structure will be interpreted as State. Motifs of 
the form State /Arg.^,... Arg.n/ ® shall be called descriptive 
motifs. 
2. Let us expand world U^ into world Uj by introducing 
an individual - called Natural Force /NF/ - that has the 
ability of bringing about changes in Objects, but itself 
cannot be affected by any change. A change brought about by 
NF shall be called Natural Event /N-Event/. When interpreting 
the Pred. expression as N-Event, we obtain a new form of 
motifs: N-Event /Arg.^,... Arg.n/. Motifs of this form are 
N-event motifs. 
3. World U 2 is expanded into world U^ by the addition of 
an individual called Agent. Agent is such an individual that 
can bring about Intentional changes in Objects and also in 
himself. Speaking about intentional changes means that we 
relate somehow the bringing about of the change /the event/ 
to a mental state /or event/ called intention; and this, in 
turn, means that Agent is an individual that can be assigned 
mental properties. As a result, world U^ permits two new 
% semantic interpretations of the Pred. expression: Action 
\ 
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/bringing , about a change of state intentionally/ and Mental 
State I Event. Motifs with the former predicate are called 
action motifs, those with the latter one - Ment-state or 
Ment-event motifs. 
4. World u^ is a world where more than one individual 
of the type Agent is present. For theoretical purposes, we 
can use two-agent world as representative of U^. In U^, a 
new semantic interpretation of the term Pred. is possible, 
namely Interaction. Motifs with this predicate shall be 
called interactional motifs. 
Descriptive, N-event, action, interactional and mental 
motifs are the basic classes of elementary semantic units 
of narrative. A detailed investigation is needed in order 
to justify and develop this motif system. Here, I can do 
no more than to point to some crucial problems which require 
further study: 
1. N-event motifs. N-event motifs are descriptions of 
changes which are brought about by an inanimate Natural 
Force which can be, in principle, identified with the laws 
of nature. These events can affect both Objects /in world 
U2/ and Agents /in world U3 and U4/. The difficulty with 
the concept of Natural Force ' lies in the fact that rarely 
or, perhaps, never an expression corresponding to this 
argument appears in the surface structure of sentences; 
rather, we find there nominal phrases with natural 
phenomena lexemes, auch as wind, storm, sea, etc. In a 
typical case, these lexemes are to be semantically interpreted 
as natural instruments, while the underlying Natural Force is 
treated as the prime "Causer": John was killed by lightning 
/lightning is the instrument of NF/. A strong evidence for 
this analysis is offered by Russian sentences of the type: 
Ivana ubilo molnljej where the surface cases reflect most 
directly the underlying argument structure and the impersonal 
form of the verb is the result of a special transformation 
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triggered by the argument NF. /It is impossible to say: £ 
Ivana ubllo avtomobllem, since avtomob.1.1 ' cannot be 
interpreted as natural instrument./ 
2. Action motif3. Intentionality is crucial for the 
concept of action /cf. Meiland 1970, 38-43/, but a purely 
linguistic analysis of action sentences has difficulties in 
expressing it in its system of "deep cases". For action 
theory - and motif theory as well - the main question is: 
when can we say that an Agent acted intentionally and when 
is such a description inappropriate? I would like to argue 
I in contrast, for example, to Brennenstuhl 1975: 183-185/ 
that the Agent is "responsible" /in the widest sense for 
both his successful and unsuccessful actions. A successful 
action is such an action where the Agent achieved the intended 
end-state. If the intended end-state is not achieved, but 
Instead another end-state is achieved, the action is un-o 
successful. We say that an accident happened. There is 
a variety of accidents /not necessarily harmful to the Agent/, 
but all of them are to be considered "by-products" of 
intentional acting. It has no sense, in my opinion, to call 
accidents "non-actions" /Prennenstuhl, op. cit./, or to 
treat the Agent as "Force" in the semantic representation of 
accidents /Huddleston 1970: 505/. Since accidents very often 
play a crucial role in the structuring of stories, the study 
of motifs of narrative accidents is of major significance for 
narrative semantics. 
3. Interactional motifs. Interaction is a symmetrical 
exchange of acts where two /at least two/ individuals 
alternate in the roles of Agent and Patient: John hit Paul. 9 
- Paul, hit John. Agent is the individual whose Action 
brings about the change of state; Patient is the individual 
whose state is changed by the Action. Thus, in Interaction, 
the change of state brought about by the Agent is identical 
with the effect produced in the Patient. Since both Agent 
and Patient are necessary arguments of Interaction, the only 
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way for an individual to escape the role of Patient is to 
abandon the interactional exchang^. 
Interaction is the most complex category of events and -
because of its complexity - it assumes a central role in 
stories. It cannot be explained by the models of acting 
which are valid in the one-agent world /world U^/; rather, 
a special theory of narrative Interaction is to be developed. 
This theory has to take account of the fact that Interaction 
each individual pursues its own intentions. Various modes 
of Interaction - ranging from cooperation to conflict -
can be defined on the basis of the relationships between 
the intentions of the participating individuals /see 
Dolezel, forthcoming/. 
4. Mental motifs. Mental states and events of acting 
characters have been always of great interest for narrative 
theory, being usually treated under the label of "psychology". 
We have to emphasize, however, that in stories mental motifs 
have no autonomous character, but are always related to actions 
and .interactions. The category of mental events presents a 
special difficulty for semantic analysis, because of the un-
certainty about their intentionality. Whereas some mental events 
such as computation or argumentation, are clearly controlled by 
intention, other Ment-events seem to happen spontaneously, not 
unlike Matural events. In a language like Russian, it is 
possible to distinguish between ja cho^u and mne cho£etsja, the 
first phrase being close to an action description, the second 
one to an N-event description. Narratives have widely utilized 
these alternative modes of description, presenting the 
mental life as either controlled by the acting character's 
intentions, or as a spontaneous "stream-of-consciousness", 
thus, in fact, exposing different "philosophies of mind". 
I have emphasized that the problems of a systematic motif 
theory are too complex to be given a satisfactory treatment 
in a brief paper. What seems clear, however, is the fact 
motif theory can contribute substantially to our understanding 
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of the structures and meanings of stories. The "surface" 
meaning of stories is much richer than Proppian semantics has 
been ready to acknowledge. It is likely that when this 
richness has been fully explored, the models of Proppian 
interpretations will have to become much richer themselves. 
Footnotes: 
^ This assumption was explicitly formulated by A. Dundes 
/see Dundes 1975/. 
2 In Dolezel /1976/ narrative modalities have been proposed 
as the theoretical basis of these transformations. 
^ Tomashevski's concept of motif is essentially different 
from the well-known usage of the term in folkloristic 
and comparative studies; there, motif is "the smallest 
element of narrative which has the power to be preserved . 
in the tradition" /"das kleinste Element einer Erzählung, 
das die Kraft hat, sich in der Uberlieferung zu erhalten" 
LUthi 1962/. This concept of motif is necessarily historical. 
4 
The link between the logical form of sentences and the 
"case grammar" is quite obvious in light of Fillmore's 
statement: "The propositional core of a simple sentence 
consists of a 'predicator' ... in construction with one 
or more entities, each of these related to the predicator 
in one of the semantic functions known as /deep structure/ 
'cases"' /Fillmore; 1971:37/. 
^ Thus, for example, natura], death or suicide is a common 
ending of storj.es, whereas violent death is usually just 
the beginning of a story. 
® To simplify our exposition, we leave the argument 
expressions uninterpreted; obviously, they should be ' 
interpreted - in a proper way - in terms of individuals 
of the corresponding worlds. 
^ The concept of Natural Force has been accepted into some 
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system of "case grammar" /Huddleston 1970, Nilsen 1973/; 
however, a negative assessment was given by Fillmore 
/Fillmore 1971:44/. 
g 
If an Agent drives his car to his office and reaches this 
office /the intended end-state/, his action is successful; 
is on his way he hits a pole and winds up in a hospital 
/unintended end-state/, an accident happened. 
9 
The symmetry is a fundamental property of interacting 
simpliciter. If some restrictions /for example, power 
restrictions/ are imposed in world U^, an individual 
can be prevented from responding in accordance with this 
symmetry. Such ans similar restrictions, however, are 
not inherent in Interaction and have to be explained in 
other /for example, deontic/ terms. 
The relationship between mental motifs and action or 
interaction motifs can be studied on the model of 
practical reasoning /see, for example, Apostel 1976/. 
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